INTRODUCTION

A recent and now rapidly growing literature establishes a number of positive links between various aspects of gender equality and quality of government. This literature suggests close links between gender equality and the provision of a host of public goods, including democratic accountability (Coleman 2004; Fish 2002; Goetz 2009; Norris and Inglehart 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel and Alexander 2014; Welzel 2013), intra and interstate peace (Hudson, Ballif-Spanvill, Caprioli and Emmett 2012), economic growth (Blackden, Canagarajah, Klasen and Lawson 2007; Coleman 2004; Duflo 2012; Kabeer and Natali 2013; Klasen 2002; Seguino 2000; World Bank 2011), rule of law (Branisa, Klasen and Ziegler 2013; Welzel and Alexander 2014) and low corruption (Goetz 2007, Branisa, Klasen and Ziegler 2013). Indeed, numerous studies confirm that *ceteris paribus* when a country performs well in gender equality, it performs well in quality of government and vice versa. While the literature continues to firmly establish this link, whether the link exists because gender equality is simply one of many quality of government outcomes or a *key driver* of
higher quality of government remains heavily contested. This begs the question: Are there good reasons to assume that gender equality plays an independent, causal role in countries’ varying quality of government across the globe?

When one considers of the power of gender as a socialization agent, a role for gender equality becomes highly plausible. We refer to gender in describing the myriad ways that social meaning is attributed to biological sex differences. The key question that arises when we consider how gender varies across the globe is what roles, traits and potential individuals are socialized to accept given their sex.

The gendered outcomes of various social indicators suggest that gender role socialization has been and continues to be especially limiting of the empowerment of women and girls. A look at the global spread in female resources, motivation and achievements, shows that gender role socialization often develops harmful norms that legitimate the treatment of women and girls as inferior and exploitable based on sex differences as opposed to universally valuable and capable regardless of these differences. Even countries with the smallest gender gaps continue to encounter deeply rooted path dependencies that privilege men. Indeed, at one point in history, every country has engaged in the development of gendered institutions that legitimate male privilege in resources and decision-making autonomy.

Thus access to unchecked power over women and girls is in many ways a historical universal for men. In fact, it is through the social function that is attributed to sex differences that we observe some of the earliest human tendencies to legitimate the power of some over others as natural and uncontested. I argue that change in these early tendencies from socialization that primarily legitimizes female exploitation and repression to that which legitimizes female value and capability regardless of sex difference is vital to understanding countries’ historical trajectories in quality of government. It is through gender roles that
individuals internalize some of the most pervasive grassroots’ experiences of power and this has profound normative implications for the more formal culture of power that masses accept.

In the pages that follow, the theoretical section covers why more generally one might consider gender role socialization a normative driver of a society’s larger culture of power and the implications for quality of government. This section also discusses the theoretical and empirical leverage we gain from looking deeper at the unique advance in gender equality in the household in western Europe circa 1500 as indicative of how early grassroots’, mass patterns in gendered norms and behaviors send countries on virtuous or vicious trajectories in the interplay between household equality, female empowerment and egalitarian state capacity.

The empirical section tests hypotheses derived from the theory on the relationship between global historical trends in gender equality and quality of government institutions and norms. In particular, I build on recent research by Uslaner and Rothstein (2014) that shows the long term effect of mass education levels on levels of corruption with cross-national, historical analysis. I bring in fertility data for gauging the long term effects of household gender equality on quality of government from 1800 to today. The evidence also shows that lower fertility and mass education levels virtuously interplay overtime, and this virtuous interplay is fundamental to quality of government. While as recent research suggests, countries’ levels of mass education reflect egalitarian state building, I argue that fertility rates give us insight into the informal, grassroots’ structures of equality that operate largely through gendered norms and are as vital to the historical development of quality of government.

Theory

Gender Role Socialization, the Culture of Power and Quality of Government

Patriarchy and the Culture of Power. Gender role socialization is rooted in discrimination. Traditionally, gender role socialization has ascribed different sets of emotions, traits and styles of reasoning to sex differences, socialized females and males accordingly, and
distorted opportunity structures for exercising power by privileging males. Ultimately, the legitimacy basis for male-dominant power in traditional gender role systems is biological difference; male dominance is largely perceived as natural on account of sex differences in size, strength and reproductive investment (Hudson et al. 2012).

In this sense, gender role socialization has patriarchal roots. Various definitions of patriarchy abound and scholars have observed wide variation in patriarchal systems culturally and historically (see, for instance, Acker (1989), Goldberg (2008), and Patil (2013) for reviews). We can, however, turn to Walby (1989: 214) for some consensus on a core definition, “patriarchy is a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women.” Based on this definition, in the end, patriarchy is a system of unchecked power that finds its legitimacy in how gender is socialized. This system is not only discriminatory, it also tends towards patterns of corruption in the sense that, conceivably, such a system could lead to men’s abuse of their power through female exploitation for private gains, such as sexual pleasure and freedom from unpaid labor. In short, patriarchal gender role socialization generates a widespread, informal culture of power that seriously undermines quality of government norms.

In fact the key normative principle behind quality of government is undermined. Many in the literature consider this normative principle impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). The quality of government rests on both input and output impartiality. Input impartiality is accomplished through procedures that achieve and maintain impartiality in authorizing and holding accountable those in power. Many would agree that the principle of political equality at the core of democratic institutionalization exemplifies this kind of impartiality. Output impartiality is impartiality in the exercise of public authority.

On the flip side, partialities in the authorization and exercise of public authority constitute bad government. Two forms of bad government are highlighted in the literature: corruption and discrimination. The standard definition of corruption is abuse of public office
for private gain. When this occurs it can be considered a self-regarding partiality in the authorization and exercise of power. Selfishly, the power holder uses public authority for his or her own private gain. Discrimination is based on other-regarding partialities in the authorization and exercise of power; some are regarded as inferior and therefore repressed relative to others. In both cases, power is used to undermine rather than promote the public good.

To return to the implications for gender role socialization, patriarchal systems thrive through the use of natural sex difference to legitimate *partial authorization of some to power relative to others and the partial exercise of power over some relative to others*. This leads to multiple, highly pervasive, highly visible symbols and acts of discrimination and abuse of power for male gains. These repeated, “normalized” experiences create a legitimacy basis for other forms of authoritarian, partial treatment. Among these, for instance, are past and present injustices that rest on a biological and/or religious authorization of the unequal worth of some relative to others by such “natural” legitimacy bases as birth right, ethnic/racial right, divine right or familial right. Ultimately, an informal culture of power results that makes *impartiality* in the authorization and exercise of power seemingly unnatural since it appears exceptional to the “everyday” order of things. This presents a formidable barrier to the development of values that societies need to develop quality of government.

*Gender Diversity and the Culture of Power.* While the patriarchal roots of gender role socialization are nearly universal, there is powerful evidence of historical and cross-national variation away from patriarchal gender role socialization and towards support for equal treatment, value and capability regardless of sex differences (Inglehart and Norris 2003). This change operates largely through female empowerment; gender role socialization transitions from primarily legitimating female exploitation and repression to legitimating female value and capability regardless of sex difference. By creating new norms that prioritize universal value and capability, the informal practice of power in everyday interactions is transformed.
The everyday relations of power between the sexes become more contested and negotiated as progressive gender role socialization diversifies human motivations, access to power, power norms, the exercise of power and empowered interests by dissolving (slowly) sex ascribed roles. This directly challenges hegemonic and masculine cultures of power that stifle the deepening of impartiality norms and ultimately achievements in quality of government.

*Early Patterns of Household Gender Equality: Implications for Egalitarian State Capacity and Quality of Government*

So far we have considered the plausibility of gender equality as a key driver of quality of government purely on theoretical grounds. To buttress these ideas, I turn to one of the major historical turns in grassroots’ patterns of gender equality that set North Western Europe apart in its gender egalitarian trajectory from 1500 to the present relative to other world regions. In this turn we observe the impact of gender role socialization on norms that underpin the emergence and deepening of egalitarian state capacity and quality of government.

Around 1500, several authors note a turn toward a unique pattern of relatively higher levels of gender equality in household formation in North Western Europe (Hartman 2004; Hajnal 1965, 1982). We see the emergence of the late marriage, single family household; a pattern of household formation that is unique in its relative empowerment of women and girls compared to other household formation patterns throughout the globe. The more standard household formation pattern followed an early marriage, multi-family structure. Figure 1 summarizes the key differences between the two systems highlighted following Hartman’s (2004) extensive research into these systems.

<insert Figure 1 about here>

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1 The pattern covers “England, the Low Countries, much of Scandinavia, northern France, and the German-speaking lands” (Hartman 2004: 6).
This early turn in household equality created a system of relative impartiality in the approach to sex differences which encouraged more universalism in the development of skills and social bonds. This system’s exceptionalism seems largely to have derived from the fragility of single family household. The unit consists of just a two person partnership. Thus, there is not a surplus of kin for the purposes of labor replacement in instances of various calamity (e.g., sickness, accident or violence). This conditions an informal network of contracted servitude from outsiders as a kind of insurance and an extended stage of skill development and resource acquisition prior to founding one’s own household. In this way, the fragility kicks off a virtuous exchange between servitude and non-kin related labor opportunities. Outside servitude is needed to compensate for a lack of labor surplus from extended kin, and this creates opportunities to develop skills as well as acquire a resource base by providing service in “outsider” households. Thus, ultimately, this system divorces skill development, caring and resource acquisition from the kinship system and in so doing creates unique opportunities for the more impartial treatment of sex differences in the roles that are assumed throughout the lifecycle and in the household. In short, this system is unique in its induced level of gender convergence.

It is the relative empowerment of women and girls that largely drives this convergence and sets the system apart. One of the quintessential mechanisms of empowerment is the extent to which the single family system conditions a later age of women at marriage. The relative fragility of the system makes it crucial for women and girls to develop a range of skills prior to forming the household. This phase of skill development rises the age of female marriage. The value attributed to women thereby transitions from being capable of reproduction to being a capable partner. What results are women who enter into marriage as mature adults with greater skill, some economic autonomy and experiences with social bonding that are not limited to kin.
In contrast, the reliance on kin for labor that is indicative of multifamily households centers the value attributed to women on their ability to reproduce. Thus, it becomes essential that women are maximized for this purpose over their child-bearing years. Hence, marriageability is largely biologically determined and focused on female reproductive potential. Girls are therefore married off at the time of puberty as adolescents to mature, adult men. This severely reduces their autonomy in the marriage relationship and the household. Under this power differential, the kinship hierarchy is male, following the male bloodline. This leaves women outside the household power structure. In this case, compared to the single family household, we see a dramatic divergence in the autonomy that men experience versus women within the household and over the lifecycle.

The way that these two systems diverge in gender role socialization and the culture of everyday power has some important normative implications that carry weight in considering gender equality a mechanism for the development and deepening of quality of government. The gender role socialization and behavior in the late marriage, single family household generates greater value for equality and out-group trust while the early marriage, multifamily household generates greater value for inequality and in-group trust. Indeed, the single family system diverges in the degree to which behavior and socialization encourages universalism in the everyday development of skills and social bonds. This is a powerful generator of norms that support the more formal institutionalization of egalitarian state capacity and consequently quality of government. In addition, these household patterns also send countries on more virtuous, path dependent trajectories of empowering women and girls and, ultimately, gender diversity.

Thus, in the end, the informal turn towards greater gender egalitarianism in early household formation patterns is potentially a catalyst for a more formal replacement of institutions geared towards universalism by the state. And, as this system’s relatively unique empowerment of women and girls erodes one of the earliest legitimacy bases for partial,
unchecked power of some over others, it provides the normative development and reinforcement for the deepening of egalitarian state capacity and quality of government into the future.

Hypotheses, Data, Methods and Results

Some Global Evidence: Fertility Rates in 1800, Mass Schooling in 1900 and Quality of Government Today

In this section we turn to some long term, cross-national evidence for support of the theory that household patterns of gender equality generate the normative bases that build and deepen quality of government. To do so, I build on recent research by Uslaner and Rothstein (2014) that shows the long term effect of mass education levels on levels of corruption with cross-national, historical analysis. I bring in fertility data from as early as 1800 for gauging the long term effects of household gender equality on quality of government and generalized social trust, a key general norm highlighted in the literature.

Fertility rates move in slow path dependencies over time, suggesting that early patterns of gender equality in 1800 send countries on gender equality trajectories. The evidence shows that like mass education levels, lower fertility in 1800 shapes quality of government in 2012 and generalized social trust in the mid to late 2000s. The evidence also shows that lower fertility and mass education levels virtuously interplay overtime, and this virtuous interplay is fundamental to improving quality of government.

Before heading into the discussion of the analysis and results, I present my hypotheses, describe the data and offer a brief outline of the analytical strategy for testing the hypotheses.

Hypotheses, Data and Methods

Hypotheses. I derive the following hypotheses from the theory presented above.
H1: Lower fertility in 1800 will have a positive, independent effect on quality of government and generalized trust in the 2000s under control of other potentially confounding historical drivers.

H2: Lower fertility in 1800 and mass education levels in 1900 will be the two strongest predictors of quality of government and generalized trust in the 2000s compared to contending historical drivers.

H3: Fertility rates and mass education rates are strongly related over time, sending countries on mutually reinforcing path dependencies.

Data. To support my theoretical expectations, I assume that fertility rates are an acceptable proxy for capturing the historical variation in gender equality in households. In the literature describing the North West European turn both Hartman (2004) and Hajnal (1965, 1982) note that a lower fertility rate is an externality of the relative empowerment of women under the late marriage, single household system. Moreover, the fertility rate data creates the opportunity to conduct global, systematic comparison from the pre-modern era to today. Thus we gain tremendous temporal leverage with this indicator in comparison to existing gender indicators. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to look at some current trends with key gender equality indicators as an extra check on the validity of fertility rates as a proxy for gender equality in the household.

Figures 2 and 3 show the relationship between the global variation in current fertility data and two leading global measures of gender equality. One covers the global variation in gender gaps in resources and achievements. This is the United Nation Development Programm’s Gender Inequality Index (GII). The other indicator captures the global variation in countries’ formal legal adoption and enforcement of gender equality in family law from the Womanstats data project.

<insert Figures 2 and 3 about here>
Even today with the availability of contraceptive technology and the growing strength of
transnational efforts to improve female reproductive autonomy, the trends offer powerful
confirmation that fertility rates vary and that variation is profoundly linked with other trends
in gender equality. I therefore consider fertility rates a suitable proxy for measuring gender
equality in the household, particularly, in 1800.

All global fertility data are taken from the Gap Minder database
(http://www.gapminder.org/).

In addition to early patterns in fertility rates, I am also interested in how fertility rates
and historical levels of mass education work together as two key drivers of quality of
government and generalized trust. To measure mass education levels in 1900, I use the data
offered by Uslaner and Rothstein (2014). This captures countries mean years of schooling in
1870.

Ultimately, I am interested in the impact of fertility rates measured in 1800 on quality
of government and generalized social trust today. To measure the global variation in quality
of government, I use the World Bank’s Rule of Law data for 2012. To measure the global
variation in generalized social trust, I take survey data from waves 5 and 6 of the World
Values Surveys. The years covered span 2005-2013.

Following Uslaner and Rothstein (2014), I control for Protestant religious legacy,
democracy, percentage of family farms and gross domestic product in purchasing power
parities. The religion in history with the strongest emphasis on individualism is arguably
Protestantism (Weber [1908] 1954; Lal 1998). This religion came into being through the
Reformation, which coincided with the early colonial period and the florescence of pre-
industrial capitalism. Not coincidentally, pre-industrial capitalism and the Reformation
succeeded mostly in those regions of Europe where we also see the unique turn towards late
marriage, single household formation. Protestantism’s emphasis on individualism in
relationships forged with God is considered a mechanism of greater equality and autonomy
among masses through increases in mass literacy and plural, decentralized institutionalization of the church. Thus this is a candidate as a key historical driver for which one must control. A Protestant legacy is measured as the percent Protestants in a country in 1980 with data from the CIA World Factbook.

Another plausible driver could be a longer heritage with democratic institutions. As I mentioned above, input impartiality is accomplished through procedures that achieve and maintain impartiality in authorizing and holding accountable those in power. And, many would agree that the principle of political equality at the core of democratic institutionalization exemplifies this kind of impartiality. Thus, it is important to control for the early institutionalization of democracy. Level of democracy is measured in 1900 with the Polity IV data.

The literature also suggests that the prevalence of autonomous family farms indicative of pre-modern North Western Europe could be a historical driver of country trajectories in quality of government. The medieval “hide system” in Northwestern Europe is probably the best known example (Mitterauer 2009). In this system, the family farm operated as an autonomous production unit in cultivating its own slot of land, the “hide.” Farmers voluntarily joined village associations that served to self-administer their joint affairs and to represent their interests vis-à-vis the lord. Powelson (1997) describes this particular form of social organization as “contractual feudalism.” This early practice of contracting could be a powerful normative source of values attributed to accountability and impartial treatment in power relations. Thus, it is important to control for this as a contending historical driver. The percentage of family farms data is measured in 1870 and comes from Vanhanen.

Finally, countries’ level of market resources could drive increases in multiple forms of capacity, such as higher capacity in human capital and technology, which has historical implications for countries’ current levels of quality of government. This is a final key control
that I include in the analysis. Gross domestic product measured in purchasing power parities is measured in 1800 and also comes from the Gap Minder project.

**Analytic Strategy:** To test H1 and H2, I use ordinary least squares regression analysis to look at the effect of lower fertility on quality of government and generalized trust under the relevant controls. Finally, to test H3, I look at the strength of the bivariate relationship between fertility rates and levels of mass education over several points in time to evaluate whether these two factors mutually reinforce one another over time.

**Results**

Before we move into the multivariate analysis, Figures 4 and 5 give us a look at the bivariate relationships between fertility rates (inverted) in 1800 and rule of law in 2012 and fertility rates in 1800 and generalized social trust. Both scattergrams suggest an early confirmation of H1.

<insert Figures 4 and 5 about here>

Both show a moderately strong, positive trend. Moreover, it is important to note that the leaders both in low fertility, high rule of law and generalized social trust fall largely in North Western Europe, the region that made the early historical turn towards the late marriage, single family household system.

From this look at basic trends, we turn to the results of the multivariate analyses. Table 1 displays these results. Each model includes the fertility data, mass education data and one control variable due to sample size and multicollinearity.³ The results offer a rather powerful confirmation for both H1 and H2.

<insert Table 1 about here>

³ The number of cases for which the mass education data is available is much more limited than the fertility rate data. In this case, for predicting rule of law, I have 75 cases and for generalized social trust 39. These numbers drop slightly with some controls which also have limited data. Thus, I limit my models to just one control variable.
Whether predicting today’s variation in rule of law of generalized social trust, lower fertility in 1800 and higher average schooling in 1900 are positive and significant and the two strongest historical drivers in the models. In fact, in the majority of the models the third possible historical driver does not reach significance and, yet, the explained variance across all models is considerably high, above an adjusted $R^2$ of .70 in most cases. In this case, lower fertility rates ala the expectation in H1 is a significant and positive predictor of rule of law and generalized social trust under control of all competing historical drivers. And, lower fertility rates constitute the strongest historical driver along with levels of mass education of rule of law and generalized social trust today, confirming H2.

We now turn to an analysis of the evidence from the perspective of H3’s expectation: fertility rates and mass education rates are strongly related overtime, sending countries on mutually reinforcing path dependencies. To support the possibility that these two factors create a virtuous, mutually reinforcing nexus that sends countries on positive quality of government trajectories, I look at the relationship between the two in the 1800s and over every decade from 1960 to 2000. Figure 6 presents a scattergram depicting the relationship between lower fertility rates in 1800 and levels of mass schooling in 1870. While there are some outlying cases, the trend is generally strong and positive. Moreover, importantly, again we see at the top of the distribution mostly countries from North Western Europe represented. This once again supports the likelihood that the gender egalitarian transition happening at the through household formation patterns reinforced the formal expansion of egalitarian state capacity, through key mechanisms like universal education.

It is also important to evaluate whether lower fertility and mass education continue to show a strong positive relationship overtime as countries’ develop more complex government institutions. Toward this end, Table 2 offers a preliminary look at the long term path
dependency of these two variables. This table shows the relationship between fertility rates and schooling over every decade from 1960 to 2000. The correlations are similarly high and significant regardless of the year from which the data are taken. This is yet another piece of evidence that suggests that these two factors create a virtuous, mutually reinforcing nexus; more egalitarian capacity in everyday household patterns supports egalitarian state capacity and both foster the deepening of impartiality norms and ultimately achievements in quality of government.

**Conclusion**

While the relationship between gender equality and quality of government finds widespread acceptance in the literature, the question of the role of gender equality as a cause or an outcome is contested terrain. Sorting out any historical driver of quality of government is difficult work. When we observe global historical variation in quality of government, countries move along slow, path dependent trajectories. In short, quality of government has deep roots and any driver must therefore also have deep roots. From the perspective of historical depth, gendered norms, institutions and behavior are up to the task. It is through gender patterns that we observe some of the earliest human tendencies to legitimate the power of some over others as natural and uncontested. We also observe great variation overtime in the transition of those patterns towards universal, impartial treatment.

This paper engages gender role socialization’s deep historical roots and argues that change in early tendencies from socialization that primarily legitimizes female exploitation and repression to that which legitimizes female value and capability regardless of sex difference is vital to understanding countries’ historical trajectories in quality of government. It is through gender roles that individuals internalize some of the most pervasive grassroots’ experiences of power and this has profound normative implications for the more formal culture of power that masses accept.
For theoretical insight, I focus on the unique advance in gender equality in the household in north western Europe circa 1500 as indicative of how early grassroots’, mass patterns in gendered norms and behaviors send countries on virtuous or vicious trajectories in the interplay between household equality, female empowerment and egalitarian state capacity. I then turn to an analysis of fertility rate data from 1800 and show that along with mass education, the level of fertility is a key historical driver of quality of government institutions and norms. Ultimately, these two factors create a virtuous, mutually reinforcing nexus; more egalitarian capacity in everyday household patterns supports egalitarian state capacity and both foster the deepening of impartiality norms and ultimately achievements in quality of government. These findings make an important contribution to the debate over gender equality’s role in the “quality of government equation.”

In addition to contributing to the debate on gender equality’s role, demonstrating that gender equality is a key driver potentially lends insight into an additional major puzzle in the quality of government literature. The underperformance of democracies on various quality of government indicators is gaining increasing attention. Ideally, one would expect congruence between input impartiality and output impartiality, and, as the leading design for securing the quality of input impartiality, would expect uniformly high performance on the delivery of quality of government outcomes among democracies. In fact, this is the leading assumption of pundits of the claim that gender equality has an independent, positive effect on quality of government and is not just an outcome. For instance, Sung (2003) argues that fair systems produce both gender equality and other public goods provisions. For Sung (2003), the governing system most indicative of fairness is democracy. Thus, under Sung’s “fair system’s thesis” input impartiality in the quality of government, democracy, leads to both gender equality and other forms of what might be considered output impartiality.

Sung (2003) is, however, clearly unfamiliar with a volume of research by women and politics’ scholars that note consistent failures among democracies in the adoption and
enforcement of rights for women and closing gender gaps in resources and women’s inclusion (Bystydzienski and Sekhon 1999; Goetz and Hassim 2002; Pateman 1989; Paxton 2000; 2009; Phillips 1991; Waylen 1994; Young 1990). The evidence from this line of research rather powerfully shows that democracy does not necessarily translate into female empowerment.

The evidence presented in this paper suggests that gender equality failures could have a profound effect on just how far democracy can lead to deeper, more holistic quality of government where impartiality and universalism is maximized from start to finish. This carries important policy implications for democracies and government’s generally. The evidence suggests that gender equality must be prioritized as a strategy not an outcome in the effort to improve quality of government.
References


Delhey, Newton & Welzel (2012).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DV: Rule of Law 2012</th>
<th>DV: Generalized Trust</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M 1</td>
<td>M 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertility 1800 (inverted)</td>
<td>.36***</td>
<td>.29***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Schooling 1900</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>.61***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy 1900</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP PPP 1800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Farms 1870</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Protestants</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>.73***</td>
<td>.73***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients based on Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis. ***p≤.001, **p≤.01, *p≤.05, ƚp≤.10.
### Table 2
Correlations between Female Fertility and Average Years of Schooling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR OF MEASUREMENT</th>
<th>Pearson's $R$</th>
<th>$N$ (Countries)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>.80***</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>.86***</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>.85***</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>.82***</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>.78***</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1: Comparison of Household Systems**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Late Marriage, Single Family Household</th>
<th>Early Marriage, Multi-Family Household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late female age of marriage, autonomy in partner selection, both mature adults, more egalitarian partnership</td>
<td>Early female age of marriage, arranged marriage, female adolescent and male adult, more authoritarian partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing of marriage based on employment opportunity and savings for both men and women, emphasis on female as a partner</td>
<td>Timing of marriage based on biological events, female puberty, emphasis on female as a reproductive resource</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two person partnership, husband is head of household, more horizontal structure</td>
<td>Male kinship hierarchy, father or widower head of household, sons in line as heirs, more hierarchical structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragility over the life-cycle, partnership with wife is crucial to household survival, wife reliance and value, more female empowering</td>
<td>Kinship surplus for household labor, production and care of kin, sons’ wives and daughters are expendable, more female exploitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragility over the life-cycle, demand for contracted domestic service, outsider reliance, diverse social bonds, out group oriented</td>
<td>Son preference and female exploitation acceptable, male kin network reliance, kin bonds, in group oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young adult pre-marital male and female contracted mobility to various households, diverse social bonds, out group oriented</td>
<td>No male or female pre-marital mobility from natal household, kin bonds, in group oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender convergence, women have more skill development, economic autonomy, mobility and household decision-making power</td>
<td>Gender divergence, rigid division of sexual labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System of relative impartiality in approach to sex differences, encourages universalism in the development of skills and social bonds. With servitude contracts we see early forms of institutionalization which could be a precursor to egalitarian state capacity.</td>
<td>System of relative sex-based partiality, clientelistic networks, mistrust of outsiders and high internal inequality justified on the basis of natural differences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2

r = .77***, N = 139

Figure 3

r = .67***, N = 158