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QoG lunchseminarium med Mogens K. Justesen

Seminarium

The QoG Institute regularly organizes seminars related to research on Quality of Government. The seminars address the theoretical and empirical problem of how political institutions of high quality can be created and maintained as well as the effects of Quality of Government on a number of policy areas, such as health, the environment, social policy, and poverty.

Speakers are invited from the international research community and experts from NGOs and other organizations to the lunch seminars. The seminars last for one hour and include a short presentation by the speaker (30-35 min) followed by a joint discussion about the topic.

If nothing else is indicated, the seminars are held in English

Title of seminar:
Electoral clientelism, latent opportunism, and the secret ballot

Abstract:
The secret ballot is a cornerstone of modern democracy because it protects voter autonomy and allows voters to express their political preferences freely without fear of repercussion. In theory, the secret ballot is supposed to prevent vote buying - the exchange of money or material rewards for vote and political support - from operating during elections. Yet, empirical evidence from surveys around the world suggests that vote buying and other forms of electoral clientelism is a common feature of elections in new democracies. We address this puzzle by examining voter confidence in the secret ballot and how that matters for compliance with vote buying offers. Using data from a new post-election survey conducted in South Africa in the wake of the 2016 municipal elections, we find that offering pre-electoral incentives to voters increases the likelihood of voting for the dominant party (ANC), but mainly for voters who do not have confidence in the secret ballot. We thereby contribute to the existing literature by analyzing how and why parties operating in the shadow of the secret ballot use electoral clientelism as part of their campaign strategies, and under what circumstances such strategies are likely to work.

Föreläsare: Mogens K. Justesen Associate professor, and Vice-Head of Department, Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School https://sites.google.com/site/mkjustesen/

Datum: 2017-04-06

Tid: 12:00 - 13:00

Kategorier: Samhällsvetenskap

Arrangör: The Quality of Government Institute

Kontaktperson: Alice Johansson

Sidansvarig: Alice Johansson|Sidan uppdaterades: 2012-02-02
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